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The Promise and Limits of
Cooperative Federalism as
a Constitutional Principle
Warren J. Newman

I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I shall address the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent
jurisprudence on cooperative federalism and its promise for the future,
from the perspective of federalism as an underlying constitutional
principle. In its jurisprudence, particularly over the past decade, the
Court moved from an ostensibly neutral view on what form federalism,
as a normative concept, should take, to one of not just tolerating but
actively encouraging flexible and cooperative federalism. There are
limits to the ambit of cooperative federalism as an organizing principle,
and it must be balanced with other principles, including parliamentary
sovereignty and the separation of powers, and occasionally, with the fact
that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 18671 grant powers that
are, in principle, exclusive and not concurrent (even though they may
apply concurrently to certain matters through the double-aspect
doctrine). On the separation of powers, there are also limits to what
courts can do as adjudicative bodies in encouraging cooperation, and it
falls principally to federal and provincial political actors to determine the
dynamics and degree of cooperation, given the diversity of views and
perspectives inherent in a federal system. Given its origins in the political
dynamics of federal-provincial relations and its implementation largely
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through political agreements and more or less informal institutional or
administrative arrangements and concertation, cooperative federalism
might be better understood and applied in the legal context as a modality
of the federal principle, rather than as a full-blown constitutional
principle in its own right.

II. A FEDERAL UNION
The first purpose of the British North America Act was to unite the
provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and one might
be forgiven if, upon a cursory reading of its opening provisions, one was
to discern this as the first principle as well. The preamble to the Act
spoke of the prospective “Union” as being conducive to the welfare of
the provinces and as promoting the interests of the British Empire; that
on the “Establishment of the Union” it would be expedient to provide for
the constitution of legislative authority as well as to declare the nature of
the executive government in the new Dominion — a monarchical form
of government “under the Crown of the United Kingdom” — and to
provide for the “eventual Admission into the Union” of other parts of
British North America. Section 3 of the Act (“Declaration of Union”)
authorized the Queen, on the advice of Her Majesty’s Privy Council, to
declare by proclamation that the uniting provinces “shall form and be
One Dominion under the Name of Canada”. Section 146 enabled the
admission of other colonies or provinces “into the Union”, and at least 20
other provisions in the Act referred to “the Union”.2
However, what was contemplated was to be a federal union; the
provinces were (in the words of the preamble) to be “federally united”;
the Canadian union would (in the words of the Supreme Court) “be able
to reconcile diversity with unity”.3 In the Quebec Secession Reference,
the Court explained that the principle of federalism underlying the
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 had “triumphed early”, ensuring
a practice of federalism that, principally through a balanced
interpretation of the federal-provincial distribution of legislative powers,
2
Sections 12, 41, 61, 65, 88, 102, 107, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 123, 124, 129,
130, 139, 140.
3
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 43
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec Secession Reference”]. For useful commentary, see notably JeanFrançois Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The ‘Principle of Federalism’ and the Legacy of the Patriation and
Quebec Veto References” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 77. For a comparative view, see W.J. Newman,
“Adjudicating Divisions of Powers Issues: A Comparative Perspective” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 139.
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maintained the diversity of the new country and the autonomy of the
provinces within it.4 At the same time, the Constitution Act, 1867 was
“an act of nation-building”; the “first step in the transition from colonies
separately dependent on the Imperial Parliament for their governance to a
unified and independent political state in which different peoples could
resolve their disagreements and work together toward common goals and
a common interest”. Federalism, the Court emphasized again, “was the
political mechanism by which diversity could be reconciled with unity”.5

III. THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE AND FEDERALISM
The federal principle — as earlier judgments of the Supreme Court
termed it, perhaps more appositely — is integrated into the very structure
of the Constitution, and is reflected, in legal terms, in the division of
powers, but also in central institutions (including the Senate and the
Supreme Court) that are constitutionally entrenched and protected. It is
also a principle that has, in political terms, provided the underlying
reason for some important constitutional practices and conventions.
It will be noted that in the Quebec Secession Reference, the Court spoke
at length of the principle of federalism, but not of cooperative federalism per
se. Indeed, in the Employment Insurance Act Reference, Deschamps J.,
writing for the Court, carefully stated an important proviso:
… To derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure
of Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers
falls primarily to governments. If an issue comes before a court, the
court must refer to the framers’ description of the power in order to
identify its essential components, and must be guided by the way in
which courts have interpreted the power in the past. In this area, the
meaning of the words used may be adapted to modern-day realities, in a
manner consistent with the separation of powers of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches.6
4

Id., at paras. 55, 58.
Id., at para. 43.
6
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57,
2005 SCC 56, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, at para. 10 (S.C.C.), revg [2004] J.Q. no 277 (Que. C.A.)
(emphasis added).
5
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That observation is, to my way of thinking, very apt. Indeed, the
almost imperceptible shift in the jurisprudence from the recognition that,
structurally, the Constitution embodies a federal principle, to the
recognition of the principle of federalism, imported with it the potential
for conflating the structural or foundational principle with the more
abstract philosophical idea — and political ideology — of federalism
itself.7 That is not inherently a bad thing, as long as lawyers and judges
are conscious of the limits of political philosophy in illuminating the
meaning of the legal provisions of the Constitution, and the limits of
their expertise as political philosophers.

IV. MANIFESTATIONS AND MODES OF FEDERALISM
An illustration may prove useful at this point. In 1965, in a seminal
piece, the late, great political scientist James R. Mallory wrote that:
Canadian federalism is different things at different times. It is also different
things to different people. This is not the result of widespread error but of
simple fact, for political institutions which accommodate diversity will
reflect the dimensions which are vital to the actors who work them.8

Professor Mallory discerned five forms of Canadian federalism over
the previous century: quasi-federalism (Professor K.C. Wheare’s
description of the early period, characterized by central dominance),
classical federalism (characterized by “the coordinate and autonomous
relationship of the central and regional organs”, and corresponding, in
the case law of the courts, to what was often called the period of legal
federalism marked by adherence to the exclusivity of federal and
provincial powers), emergency federalism (characterized by the extreme
centralization of power during wartime), cooperative federalism (which
“reached its zenith in the period since 1945”), and double-image
federalism (Mallory’s term for the dimension of Canadian duality,
7
As Professor Ronald Watts observed, federalism “is not a descriptive but a normative
term and refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered government combining elements of shared-rule and
regional self-rule. The essence of federalism as a normative principle is the perpetuation of both
union and non-centralization at the same time.” R.L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2d ed.
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), at 6.
8
J.R. Mallory, “The Five Faces of Federalism”, in P.-A. Crepeau & C.B. Macpherson,
eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), at 3. For a
more recent, sensitive and book-length treatment of the measure, practice and habit of federalism
(including a chapter on “parliamentary federalism”), vide David E. Smith, Federalism and the
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
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“the special relationship between French and English” which overlay,
and “to some extent transcends”, the central-regional relationship
between central and provincial institutions).
Other political scientists were to add to this typology and to speak of
periods or modes of executive federalism, concurrent or competitive
federalism, fiscal federalism and asymmetrical federalism.
Cooperative federalism is predicated largely on a web of more or less
informal, ongoing intergovernmental relationships and institutional
arrangements that seek to adapt the formal structure of the Constitution to
the economic and social needs and fiscal realities of a modern federal state.
Taken in that light, it is perhaps less a principle than a practice, and more
political than legal in its nature and substance, even if it had developed
partly in reaction to the formal constraints of legal federalism that had been
imposed by the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council prior to the Second World War. Professor Peter Russell called
post-war cooperative federalism “less a litigious struggle between Ottawa
and the provinces to defend and expand their own enclaves of power than
a matter of political compromise and administrative pragmatism.”9
Political scientist Donald Smiley stated that “[c]operative federalism is
in essence a series of pragmatic and piecemeal responses by the
federal and provincial governments to the circumstances of their mutual
interdependence.”10 As Professor Peter Hogg described it, the “related
demands of interdependence of governmental policies, equalization of
regional disparities, and constitutional adaptation” have produced “a
network of relationships between the executives of the central and regional
governments”, through which “mechanisms are developed, especially
fiscal mechanisms, which allow a continuous redistribution of powers and
resources without recourse to the courts or the amending process”. These
relationships have also been “the means by which consultations occur on
the many issues of interest to both federal and provincial governments”.11
Cooperative federalism, as a phenomenon, has been subject to
varying assessments over the years. Those who have tended to look upon
it with favour have pointed to its inherent flexibility and adaptability.
9
P.H. Russell, cited in David A.M. Seccareccia, “The Applicability of Co-Operative
Federalism: Lessons Learned from the Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2013) Electronic Thesis
and Dissertation Repository, Paper 1582, at 18 [hereinafter “Seccareccia”].
10
D.V. Smiley, “Co-operative Federalism: An Evaluation”, in J. Peter Meekison, ed., Canadian
Federalism: Myth or Reality, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971) 320, at 320 [hereinafter “Meekison”].
11
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supplemented (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007), c. 5.8 (“Cooperative federalism”).
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Those who have seen its effects as potentially insidious or pernicious12
have claimed (depending on their perspective) that it threatens to
centralize,13 or conversely, to decentralize,14 powers well beyond what
the formal structure of the Constitution contemplates.

V. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
The courts have not been impermeable to this kind of political
analysis and discourse, but in moving with the times, they were still
usually careful to distinguish between what was text and what was
context, and what might be considered a legal principle as opposed to a
political practice or a convention binding political actors. Thus, in the
Anti-Inflation Act Reference, Laskin C.J.C., writing for a majority of the
Supreme Court, dismissed an argument advanced by an intervener that
cooperative federalism constituted a limit upon Parliament’s legislative
authority:
One of the submissions made by counsel for Secondary School
Teachers’ organizations concerned provincial co-operation, but it was
put in terms of an objection to the validity of the federal legislation, the
proposition being that inflation was too sweeping a subject to be dealt
with by a single authority, i.e., the federal Parliament, and that the
proper constitutional approach, at least as a first approach, was through
federal-provincial co-operation in terms of their respective powers
under the respective enumerations in ss. 91 and 92. If this is meant to
suggest that Parliament cannot act in relation to inflation even in a
crisis situation, I must disagree. No doubt, federal-provincial cooperation along the lines suggested might have been attempted, but it
does not follow that the federal policy that was adopted is vulnerable
because a co-operative scheme on a legislative power basis was not

12

For a searching critique of cooperative federalism (and its arguable potential for stifling,
through collusion and opaque practices, the competition naturally inherent in a federation) from the
perspective of a Canadian economist, see Albert Breton, “Towards a Theory of Competitive
Federalism” (1987) 3 European Journal of Political Economy 263. For an able summary of and
critical observations on Professor Breton’s views, see Seccareccia, supra, note 9, at 29-38.
13
For an illustration, see Jean-Marc Léger, “Cooperative Federalism or the New Face of
Centralization”, in Meekison, supra, note 10, at 317.
14
Smiley, supra, note 10, at 332: “The first kind of danger to the Canadian federal system
in cooperative federalism is that provincial pressures for autonomy will so weaken the federal
government that it will be unable to discharge its responsibilities for the integration and development
of the Canadian economy, for economic stabilization and growth and for interregional and
interpersonal equalization. There are strong forces towards the enhanced power of the provinces.”
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tried first. Co-operative federalism may be consequential upon a lack of
federal legislative power, but it is not a ground for denying it.15

In the Patriation Reference, while a majority of the Court opined that
the process undertaken by the federal government was constitutionally
lawful, a second majority of the same Court recognized the existence of a
constitutional convention requiring a substantial degree of provincial
consent before constitutional amendments affecting provincial powers
could be put forward, by way of resolutions of the federal houses of
Parliament, for enactment by the United Kingdom Parliament. “The
reason for the rule”, the Court stated in its majority reasons, “is the
federal principle.”
… Canada is a federal union.
.....
The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where
the modification of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by
the unilateral action of the federal authorities.16

In the Quebec Veto Reference, a unanimous Supreme Court, while
perhaps prepared to recognize the existence of a principle of Canadian
duality (which, it was urged by the Attorney General for Quebec, should
here be taken in the special sense of Quebec’s distinctiveness as a
society), could not conclude that the principle had, in and of itself, given
rise to a binding convention.
We have been referred to an abundance of material, speeches made in
the course of parliamentary debates, reports of royal commissions,
opinions of historians, political scientists, constitutional experts which
endorse in one way or another the principle of duality within the
meaning assigned to it by the appellant, and there can be no doubt that
many Canadian statesmen, politicians and experts favoured this
principle.17

However, the Court held that it was not necessary to look further into
the matter because the appellant had failed “to demonstrate compliance

15
Re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 421
(S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
16
Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution of Canada, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1
S.C.R. 753, at 905 (S.C.C.), varg [1981] M.J. No. 95 (Man. C.A.).
17
Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.J.
No. 101, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793, at 814 (S.C.C.), affg [1982] C.A. 33 (Que. C.A.).
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with the most important requirement for establishing a convention, that
is, acceptance or recognition by the actors in the precedents.”
In the OPSEU case, Beetz J. held that an enactment by a provincial
legislature that bears on the operation of an institution of the provincial
government can be considered to be an amendment to the constitution of
the province, provided, inter alia, that “it is not otherwise entrenched as
being indivisibly related to the federal principle or to a fundamental term
or condition of the union”.18
Chief Justice Dickson, in his concurring opinion in OPSEU,
underscored the movement, in the recent cases of the Court, towards
allowing for “a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap between
federal and provincial powers”,19 favouring the doctrines of pith-andsubstance and double-aspect over the “watertight compartments”
approach20 that was still reflected, to some extent, in doctrines such as
interjurisdictional immunity.
In 1990, Sopinka J., writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in the
Canada Assistance Plan Reference,21 rejected an argument advanced by
the Attorney General of Manitoba that a unilateral, legislative
termination of a federal-provincial agreement under which a province
had acquired vested rights to monetary contributions would be ultra vires
Parliament, or alternatively, even if it were within Parliament’s
legislative authority under the division of powers, it would be
unconstitutional in light of the “overriding principle of federalism”.22
Justice Sopinka, who throughout his opinion had underlined that the
“applicable constitutional principle” in this reference was parliamentary
sovereignty,23 denied a role to the courts in supervising the exercise of
the federal spending power. “If a statute is neither ultra vires nor contrary
to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts have no
jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of legislative power.”24
18

Ontario Public Service Employees' Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J.
No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 40 (S.C.C.), affg [1980] O.J. No. 3863 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“OPSEU”].
19
Id., at 18.
20
For a consideration of this and other constitutional metaphors, see W.J. Newman, “Of
Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and Structural Constitution” (2015) 9 Journal of
Parliamentary and Political Law 471.
21
Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525
(S.C.C.), revg [1990] B.C.J. No. 1377 (B.C.C.A.).
22
Id., at 565.
23
Id.
24
Id., at 567 (emphasis added).
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By 2005, in the Pelland case, Abella J. upheld the validity of a federalprovincial arrangement for the marketing of chicken production, an
arrangement which, she noted, “both reflects and reifies Canadian
federalism’s constitutional creativity and cooperative flexibility”.25
Moreover, the administrative delegation “in aid of cooperative federalism”
was upheld therein in accordance with a long line of judicial precedent.26
Two years later, in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, which quickly
became the leading case (and a valiant effort to articulate a unified field
theory of federalism and its attendant constitutional doctrines), Binnie
and LeBel JJ. recognized that “while the task of maintaining the balance
of powers in practice falls primarily to governments, constitutional
doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘cooperative federalism’”.27 In this case, that meant restricting the ambit of
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, a broad application of which
would be “inconsistent’, the Court held, “with the flexible federalism that
the constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double aspect and
federal paramountcy are designed to promote”.28 Moreover, Binnie and
LeBel JJ. made the leap beyond the legal text of the Constitution to the
larger political context in which federalism operates:
… Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms. The
Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life
and for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have
rightly observed the importance of co-operation among government
actors to ensure that federalism operates flexibly. 29

This emphasis on the importance of cooperation, in a federal state,
amongst political actors was not, of course, an injunction, and construed
in the context of the case, simply meant that courts should be
encouraging rather than hindering cooperation in their application of
constitutional doctrines of interpretation to the resolution of the legal
issues before them. Nevertheless, it would not be long before divergent
perspectives on the Court would emerge as to just what facilitating
cooperative federalism might require.
25
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19,
2005 SCC 20, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), affg [2003] J.Q. no 3331 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Pelland”].
26
Id., at para. 55.
27
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3,
at para. 24 (S.C.C.), affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.).
28
Id., at para. 42.
29
Id.
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Thus it was that in Lacombe,30 Canadian Owners and Pilots
Association,31 and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference,32
Deschamps and LeBel JJ. parted company with McLachlin C.J.C. (joined
by Binnie J., amongst others) in their analysis of the demands of
federalism — and more particularly, cooperative federalism — in these
cases. In her dissenting reasons in Lacombe, Deschamps J. invoked not
only “the unwritten constitutional principle of federalism”, but also what
she called “its underlying principles of co-operative federalism and
subsidiarity”,33 to restrict the scope and application of interjurisdictional
immunity and paramountcy.34 In the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
Reference, the diverging views related to the scope of the criminal law
power in the area of health and, inter alia, the ancillary powers doctrine
in federalism analysis. Thus, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the
rational, functional connection test employed in relation to ancillary
provisions recognizes that the federal and provincial heads of power “are
no longer watertight”.
… The complexity of modern legislation will often render it impossible
for one level of government to fulfil its constitutional mandate without
trespassing on the jurisdiction of the other level. The Court’s
endorsement of a flexible, cooperative approach to federalism suggests
that this kind of pragmatic lawmaking should be encouraged … . 35

Justices LeBel and Deschamps countered that in their view the attempt
to extend the reach of the legislation under the criminal law power was
“specious” and “unacceptable under the constitutional principles which
30
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”].
31
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Association, [2010] S.C.J.
No. 39, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.).
32
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, 2010 SCC 61,
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.), varg [2008] J.Q. no 5489 (Que. C.A.).
33
Lacombe, supra, note 30, at para. 119.
34
Id., at para. 116, for example: “with all due respect for the Chief Justice, despite the fact that
she refers expressly to co-operative federalism, her approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
is antithetical to co-operation between the levels of government and the views expressed by Binnie and
LeBel JJ., writing for the majority, in Canadian Western Bank”. See also para. 107.
35
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra, note 32, at para. 139. For example,
s. 68 of the impugned legislation (authorizing the Governor in Council to declare provisions of the
statute inapplicable in a province where a provincial law contains similar provisions, pursuant to an
agreement with the province) “provides a flexible approach to federal-provincial cooperation, which is
appropriate to modern federalism, where matters frequently attract concurrent legislative authority”
(para. 152). Justices LeBel and Deschamps replied that s. 68 had given the federal government “a legal
tool to impose its own standards” and that provincial regulatory action would only be “tolerated” where
“the provinces in question adhere to the federal scheme” (para. 272).
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ground federalism”, including the principle of subsidiarity, and the
connection between the criminal law provisions and the ancillary
provisions was “artificial”.36
In canvassing the principle of federalism in the Securities Act
Reference, a unanimous Court noted that while the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council had “tended to favour an exclusive powers approach”,
the Supreme Court itself had “moved towards a more flexible view of
federalism that accommodates overlapping jurisdiction and encourages
intergovernmental cooperation”, citing the decisions in Pelland, OPSEU
and Canadian Western Bank as examples of the Court’s having “rejected
rigid formalism in favour of accommodating cooperative governmental
efforts”.37 Having said all that, the Court then pulled back significantly:
While flexibility and cooperation are important to federalism, they
cannot override or modify the separation [sic; division] of powers. The
Secession Reference affirmed federalism as an underlying
constitutional principle that demands respect for the constitutional
division of powers and the maintenance of a constitutional balance
between federal and provincial powers.
In summary, notwithstanding the Court’s promotion of cooperative and
flexible federalism, the constitutional boundaries that underlie the
division of powers must be respected. The “dominant tide” of flexible
federalism, however strong its pull may be, cannot sweep designated
powers out to sea, nor erode the constitutional balance inherent in the
Canadian federal state.38

The Court went on to find the Canada’s proposed Securities Act to be
ultra vires Parliament’s trade and commerce power, but returned, almost
lyrically, to the virtues of “a cooperative approach” that would recognize
the “essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing
Parliament to deal with genuinely national concerns”:
It is not for the Court to suggest to the governments of Canada and the
provinces the way forward by, in effect, conferring in advance
an opinion on the constitutionality on this or that alternative scheme.
Yet we may appropriately note the growing practice of resolving
the complex governance problems that arise in federations, not by the
bare logic of either/or, but by seeking cooperative solutions that meet
the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent parts.
36

Id., at paras. 271, 273 and 278.
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837,
at paras. 56-58 (S.C.C.).
38
Id., at paras. 61-62 (emphasis added).
37
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Such an approach is supported by the Canadian constitutional
principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial
governments in other fields of activities. The backbone of these
schemes is the respect that each level of government has for each
other’s own sphere of jurisdiction. Cooperation is the animating force.
The federalism principle upon which Canada’s constitutional
framework rests demands nothing less.39

One cannot fail to be impressed by the Court’s leadership, in cases
such as Pelland, Canadian Western Bank and the Securities Act
Reference, in accommodating, encouraging and promoting cooperative
federalism, not only as a discipline for itself, but also as a practice to
which enlightened federal and provincial governmental actors would be
wise to adhere. The fact that governments of various political stripes and
perspectives do not always see eye to eye on policy priorities and do not
always arrive at agreement or harmony in coordinating legislative
initiatives is no reason not to continue to signal the advantages of
cohesion. Many of the important lessons in life are best learned through
repetition, tedious though it might seem.
The difficulty arises when strong adherents of cooperative federalism
are confronted with what, to them, is clear evidence of an obstinate
failure to embrace the wisdom behind the lesson. This can lead, once
again, to starkly divergent views as to what federalism and other
constitutional principles permit or require, not only amongst the relevant
political actors, but amongst proponents on the bench.
In Attorney General of Quebec v. Attorney General of Canada,40 a
majority of the Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s legislative authority
to require the destruction of all records contained in the registries related
to the registration of long guns, consequent upon Parliament’s repeal,
through the enactment of the Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, of the
registration requirement and the decriminalization of the possession of
an unregistered long gun. The Superior Court of Quebec had declared the
impugned provision (section 29 of the Act) unconstitutional, and the
Quebec Court of Appeal had reversed that decision.
Justices LeBel, Wagner and Gascon, supported by Justice Abella,
wrote dissenting reasons. In their view, the trial judge had been correct in
39

Id., at paras. 132-133 (emphasis added).
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015
SCC 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.). For a detailed and
thoughtful critique, see Johanne Poirier, “Souveraineté parlementaire et armes à feu: le fédéralisme
coopératif dans la ligne de mire? ” (2015) 45 R.D.U.S. 47.
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finding that a federal-provincial partnership had developed with respect
to firearms control. This partnership, they wrote, was “consistent with the
spirit of cooperative federalism”.41 The “modern view” of federalism had
replaced the “classical approach” with “a more flexible conception” of
the division of powers.42 Cooperative federalism had been developed to
“adapt the principle of federalism to this modern reality”:43
Co-operative federalism reflects the realities of an increasingly complex
society that requires the enactment of co-ordinated federal and provincial
legislative schemes to better deal with the local needs of unity and
diversity … . From a legal perspective, it is by allowing for overlapping
powers through the application of the pith and substance and ancillary
powers doctrines that co-operative federalism is able to meet those needs
and, in this sense, to enable the goals of federalism to be realized.
.....
In the novel circumstances of this case, our analysis must be guided by
the Constitution’s unwritten principles. In particular, we must be
careful not to place the principle of federalism and its modern form —
co-operative federalism — in jeopardy.44

Justices Cromwell and Karakatsanis, writing for the majority of the
Court, dismissed the appeal to cooperative federalism, as advanced by
the Attorney General of Quebec.
Quebec invokes the principle of cooperative federalism in support of
both its argument that s. 29 of the ELRA is ultra vires and its claim that
Quebec has the right to receive the data contained in the CFR related to
long guns connected to Quebec. In essence, Quebec is asking us to
recognize that the principle of cooperative federalism prevents Canada
and the provinces from acting or legislating in a way that would hinder
cooperation between both orders of government, especially in spheres
of concurrent jurisdiction.
In our respectful view, Quebec’s position has no foundation in our
constitutional law and is contrary to the governing authorities from
this Court.45

The reasons of the majority characterize cooperative federalism
as a “descriptive concept” from which the courts have developed a
41
42
43
44
45

Id., at para. 149.
Id., at para. 147.
Id.
Id., at paras. 148, 151 (emphasis added).
Id., at paras. 15-16.
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“legal principle” that has been employed “to provide flexibility” in the
application of division-of-powers doctrines such as interjurisdictional
immunity and paramountcy, facilitate the enactment of interlocking
federal and provincial legislative measures and to avoid unnecessarily
constraining legislative action by each order of government.46 However,
“the limits of cooperative federalism” include the primacy of the text of
the Constitution. “The principle of cooperative federalism”, wrote
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ., “cannot be seen as imposing limits on
the otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence”:47
In our respectful view, the principle of cooperative federalism does not
assist Quebec in this case. Neither this Court’s jurisprudence nor the text
of the Constitution Act, 1867 supports using that principle to limit the
scope of legislative authority or to impose a positive obligation to
facilitate cooperation where the constitutional division of powers
authorizes unilateral action. To hold otherwise would undermine
parliamentary sovereignty and create legal uncertainty whenever one
order of government adopted legislation having some impact on the
policy objectives of another. Paradoxically, such an approach could
discourage the practice of cooperative federalism for fear that
cooperative measures could risk diminishing a government’s legislative
authority to act alone.
We conclude that the principle of cooperative federalism does not
prevent Parliament from exercising legislative authority that it
otherwise possesses to dispose of the data.48

Justices Wagner and Côté recently reiterated this view on behalf of
eight of the nine judges of the Court in Rogers Communications v.
Châteauguay,49 stating:
… [A]lthough co-operative federalism has become a principle that the
courts have invoked to provide flexibility for the interpretation and
application of the constitutional doctrines relating to the division of
powers, such as federal paramountcy and interjurisdictional immunity,
it can neither override nor modify the division of powers itself.
46
Id., at para. 17. (See also Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Lemare Lake Logging Ltd.,
[2015] S.C.J. No. 53, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.), varg [2014] S.J. No. 164 (Sask.
C.A.), per Abella and Gascon JJ. for the majority (at para. 21): “Given the guiding principle of
cooperative federalism, paramountcy must be narrowly construed.”)
47
Id., at paras. 18-19.
48
Id., at paras. 20-21 (emphasis added).
49
Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, 2016 SCC 23
(S.C.C.), per Wagner and Côté JJ. in joint reasons (McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella, Cromwell,
Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ., concurring).
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It cannot be seen as imposing limits on the valid exercise of legislative
authority: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), at
paras. 17-19. Nor can it support a finding that an otherwise
unconstitutional law is valid.50

VI. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: A MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING
THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE
That position strikes me as fundamentally sound. The “principle of
cooperative federalism” — if it is a legal or constitutional principle —
must be balanced against other constitutional principles, including the
well-established principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the emerging
principle of the separation of powers (whereby the judicial branch, like
the executive and legislative branches, must not overstep its bounds), and
must not supplant the supremacy of the Constitution’s provisions,
particularly the division of legislative powers established in sections 91
and 92 et seq. of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The jurisprudence has evolved to a point where even the majority
position is that cooperative federalism began as a “descriptive concept”
— that is, the essentially political understanding of cooperative
federalism as a series of flexible, informal, pragmatic institutional and
administrative arrangements — that has given rise to a legal principle
itself commanding, or at least encouraging, flexibility in the application
of the doctrines employed by the courts in construing the constitutional
distribution of powers. While a remarkable development, this is not
particularly troubling insofar as it has acted largely to date as a form of
self-imposed judicial restraint on the impulse to improve upon our
Constitution’s division of legislative jurisdiction and powers through
creative interpretation. The challenge is to avoid taking the further, facile
steps of abandoning the discipline of empirical analysis and conflating an
interpretive rule or legal technique with an idealized constitutional
principle of cooperative federalism, and then applying that broad
principle normatively, without much discernment, to practical situations
and dynamics perhaps better classified as something other than
cooperative in character, and thereby altering the original form and
50
Id., at para. 39. Justice Gascon, in separate reasons, contended for a “flexible approach tailored
to the modern conception of federalism, which allows for some overlapping and favours a spirit of
co-operation” (at para. 93); Wagner and Côté JJ. agreed with a generous and flexible approach, but added
(at para. 47): “However, flexibility has its limits, and this approach cannot be used to distort a measure’s
pith and substance at the risk of restricting significantly an exclusive power granted to Parliament.”
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function of the “principle” (as well as, perhaps, the constitutional division of
powers itself).
In my respectful view, however, such problems can be avoided if
cooperative federalism is better understood as a modality than a
principle. Cooperative federalism, like executive federalism, concurrent
federalism, and the many other descriptive and normative classifications
that characterize the dynamics, at any given time, of the myriad
interactions amongst political actors in a modern federal state like
Canada, is a means of implementing the federal principle that is at the
heart of the constitutional framework. With a principle comes structure
and normativity. With a modality comes fluidity and flexibility — the
very elements cooperative federalism was meant to convey.
By a modality, I do not wish to introduce yet another abstruse concept
into the rarefied field of constitutional hermeneutics — a field
increasingly plagued, from the point of view of the practitioner, by
inaccessible and intangible notions. To the contrary, the idea of
cooperative federalism as a modality is simply to see the cooperative
mode as one manner, way or means — perhaps a privileged means, but
still only one amongst others — of implementing (or in the language of
the dictionary, of doing, expressing or experiencing) federalism and the
federal principle.
I realize that beyond the structure and provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867 on the division of legislative powers, arguments may be made
that other parts of the Constitution of Canada favour the
conceptualization of cooperative federalism as an underlying structural
principle. Part III of the Constitution Act, 1982,51 for example, records a
commitment on the part of Parliament and the provincial legislatures and
the federal and provincial governments to promote equal opportunities
for the well-being of Canadians, furthering economic development to
reduce disparity, and providing essential public services of reasonable
quality to all Canadians. This undertaking is coupled with a commitment
on the part of Parliament and the government of Canada “to the principle
of making equalization payments” to ensure that provincial governments
have enough revenue to provide “reasonably comparable levels of public
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”.52 Cooperative
federalism, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, was very much associated
with the need for federal-provincial coordination, arrangements and
51
52

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 36(2).
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mechanisms to deal with fiscal imbalances, regional disparities,
equalization payments and the social safety net. However, it should be
noted that Part III also carefully preserves, in express terms, the
legislative authority of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
With respect to Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, Professor Kate
Glover has written that the multilateral procedures for constitutional
amendment substantiate the claim that cooperative federalism is more
than simply a modern mode of federalism but is “embedded within the
constitutional architecture”.53 In my view, Part V is at best agnostic as to
the virtues of cooperative federalism. It is true that the multilateral
procedures necessitate, as a matter of fact, some degree of coordination
— and thus arguably cooperation — if they are to operate effectively to
achieve constitutional change. However, the amending procedures, to the
extent that they serve the dual purpose54 of not only effecting
constitutional change where the requisite federal and provincial
authorizing resolutions have been obtained, but also protecting key
institutions and provisions against constitutional change where no such
consensus exists, might be said to rely as much on the possibility of the
non-cooperation of federal and provincial legislative bodies as on their
actual cooperation. In other words, in terms of political dynamics, the
Part V multilateral procedures may reward the recalcitrance of political
actors who do not want to achieve constitutional change, as much as they
reward the cooperation of those who do want constitutional change.
None of this is to gainsay the strong desirability of federal-provincialterritorial cooperation in the modern Canadian state, or to ignore the
fundamental character of the federal principle in animating the provisions
of the Constitution of Canada. Rather, it is to suggest that the expertise of
courts may not lie with the elucidation of cooperative federalism as a
constitutional norm and the evaluation, from a legal vantage point, of
its good-faith implementation against some theoretical standard or
idealized criterion.
53
K. Glover, “Structural Cooperative Federalism” (a paper presented at the Osgoode
Constitutional Cases Conference on April 8, 2016). See also, however, Carissima Mathen, “The
Federal Principle: Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations”, in Emmett
Macfarlane, ed., Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016),
c. 3. Professor Mathen writes, inter alia (at 75), that “The dominant judicial approach to Part V runs
the risk of reifying the federal principle at the expense of other values.”
54
I have discussed this dual purpose in previous writings: vide W.J. Newman, “Living with
the Amending Procedures: Prospects for Future Constitutional Reform in Canada” (2007) S.C.L.R.
(2d) 383, at 385-86; “Putting One’s Faith in a Higher Power: the Senate Reform Reference,
Legislative Authority and the Amending Procedures” (2015) 34 N.J.C.L. 99, at 111.
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In many cases, the indicia of federal-provincial cooperation will be
self-evident, as when federal and provincial Attorneys General band
together to defend the constitutionality of some federal or provincial
legislative measure,55 or an interlocking federal and provincial legislative
and regulatory scheme, that has been attacked by some other party.56 In
other cases, the concept of cooperation itself may give rise to differing
perspectives amongst the governmental actors before the courts.
Who must cooperate with whom for a constitutional norm or principle
of cooperative federalism to be respected? Is there cooperation when
some or perhaps most provinces fail to support a federal government
initiative? Is there cooperation when the federal government demurs, for
its own reasons, from advancing a measure initiated or supported by
certain or perhaps most provinces? Cooperation is often in the eye of the
beholder, and the perception of effective cooperation, or the lack of it,
may depend on whose interests are at play, and whether one’s own
project or initiative is at stake or whether one is on the receiving end of
importuning attentions aimed at achieving buy-in and consensus.
In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court recognized
that in the context of constitutional negotiations — even those governed
by constitutional principles including federalism, democracy,
constitutionalism and the protection of minorities — “the distinction
between the strong defence of legitimate interests” by political actors and
“the taking of positions which, in fact, ignore the legitimate interests of
others” is one that “defies legal analysis”. The “reconciliation of
legitimate constitutional interests” in such negotiations, the Court
observed, is “necessarily committed to the political rather than the
judicial realm” and the give-and-take of the negotiation process.57
Insofar as cooperative federalism as a concept is similarly predicated
upon consultations, discussions and negotiations amongst political actors
with a view to facilitating federal-provincial-territorial arrangements or
developing complementary legislative measures, the courts should be
slow to intervene on the basis of a claim that the principle of cooperative
federalism has not been fully met or respected in course of that process
or in some legislative outcome. The courts must continue to ask
themselves whether there is a justiciable claim based upon the ambit of
the provisions of the Constitution (most often in the area of the division
55

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, 2005 SCC 13,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, at para. 26 (S.C.C.), revg [2003] S.J. No. 606 (Sask. C.A.).
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Pelland, supra, note 25.
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of powers), or whether, having regard to their expertise — the
interpretation of law — an argument based on a constructive breach of a
putative constitutional norm or principle of cooperative federalism would
invite them into a realm best left to the dynamics of the political process.
To borrow another analogy from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
— this time in the field of administrative law — the fluidity of the
political dynamics and the simultaneous advocacy, defence and balancing
of legitimate interests amongst numerous federal and provincial political
actors in the pursuit of cooperative federalism involves a polycentric
evaluation that may be better performed by political scientists (and even
pundits) than legal experts. As Bastarache J. stated in Pushpanathan,
“[w]hile judicial procedure is premised on a bipolar opposition of parties,
interests, and factual discovery, some problems require the consideration
of numerous interests simultaneously, and the promulgation of solutions
which concurrently balance benefits and costs for many different
parties. Where an administrative structure more closely resembles this
model, courts will exercise restraint.”58
Conceptualizing cooperative federalism as a modality for implementing
the federal principle is one way of recognizing the limits of the courts’
role in advancing this concept, and one that is more consonant with the
Supreme Court’s appreciation of its proper place in Canada’s constitutional
and democratic institutional framework. As long as cooperative federalism
is not transformed into an obligation of result by the magical properties of
constitutional principles, it should remain a useful means of approaching
many of the challenges of the modern federal state.
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Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No.
46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.), revg [1995] F.C.J. No. 1716 (F.C.A.).

